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Political Economy and the Medici 
 
Sophus A. Reinert and Robert Fredona 
 
 
The silence of Italian Renaissance thinkers on matters of commerce has long been a locus 
communis in the history of ideas. A society grounded in international trade, which produced such 
material magnificence, and spoke so precociously about politics, it is widely believed, had 
curiously little or nothing to say of political economy. This notion is already fully and elegantly 
formed in David Hume's essay “Of Civil Liberty” (originally “Of Liberty and Despotism”): “Trade 
was never esteemed an affair of state till the last century; and there scarcely is any ancient writer 
on politics, who has made mention of it”, he writes, adding, and “[e]ven the ITALIANS have kept a 
profound silence with regard to it”. In this way, the late Istvan Hont argued, Hume “bracketed the 
Renaissance with classical antiquity” as “pre-economic and hence premodern”. 1
 
Perhaps no 
Renaissance figure is more emblematic here than Niccolò Machiavelli, whose admission, “because 
Fortune has determined that, not knowing how to talk either about the silk business or the wool 
business or about profits and losses, I must talk about politics”, has been read as an 
uncompromising (if ironically formulated) mission statement. 2
 
Transplanted from Italian to 
ultramontane soil, Machiavelli's professed inability to speak of economic matters metaphorically 
bloomed into nothing less than a dichotomy, so famously explored by J.G.A. Pocock, between 
wealth and civic virtue, the latter understood as an intellectual inheritance from Italian and 
especially Florentine (and Machiavellian) political thought. Yet recent work has argued that 
Machiavelli was indeed an economic (or at least fiscal) thinker, and, more broadly, that 
 
1 Hume, Political Essays, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 51-8, quoting 52, 
perhaps following Nicholas Barbon, A Discourse of Trade (London: Milbourn, 1690), A3v-r; Hont, Jealousy of Trade: 
International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2005), 8-9. It should be noted that Hume’s announcement unverifiably suggests an exhaustive investigation and, at 
the same time, radically privileges discourse over practice.  
2 Quoting Machiavelli's 9 April 1513 letter to Francesco Vettori, which John Najemy has rightly argued “helped to 
forge the modern image (or some of the more influential modern images) of Machiavelli”; see Najemy, Between 
Friends: Discourses of Power and Desire in the Machiavelli-Vettori Letters of 1513-1515 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993), 4 and 107-8; for the original, see Machiavelli, Tutte le opere, ed. Mario Martelli (Florence: 
Sansoni, 1971), 1131-2. For an important vehicle of this particular image, see Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions 





“commercial interests, attitudes, and priorities were thoroughly accommodated by Renaissance 
republicanism” in Italy.3
  
Hume, himself committed not to a wealth-virtue dichotomy but to showing that wealth and 
even luxury were compatible with public virtue, also looked to Florence. Indeed, Emma Rothschild 
has persuasively argued that Hume, in his essay “Of Refinement in the Arts”, employed a 
“Florentine model” of political economy. The quintessential “opulent republic”, Florence showed 
how wealth and virtue could co-exist, and its model, Rothschild writes, “lay at the centre of 
Enlightenment optimism about the progress of commerce and industry”.4 Hume knew that “the 
Florentine democracy applied itself entirely to commerce” and his argument is telling: “The same 
age, which produces great philosophers and politicians, renowned generals and poets,” he argues, 
“usually abounds with skillful weavers, and ship-carpenters. We cannot reasonably expect, that a 
piece of woolen cloth will be wrought to perfection in a nation, which is ignorant of astronomy, or 
where ethics are neglected.”5 For Hume, the Renaissance Italians were good at doing political 
economy, but bad at thinking it, bad at teaching it, leaving behind the evidence of riches and a 
“profound silence” about their role in politics and, even more so, the role of politics in acquiring 
 
3 Quoting Mark Jurdjevic, “Virtue, Commerce, and the Enduring Florentine Republican Moment: Reintegrating Italy 
into the Atlantic Republican Tradition,” Journal of the History of Ideas 62 (2001): 721-43, at 742; Jurdjevic has 
rightly called the incompatibility of wealth and virtue “the dialectical engine” of Pocock's classic The Machiavellian 
Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1975), though he is here addressing more particularly the claims of Pocock's “Civic Humanism and Its Role in Anglo- 
American Political Thought,” in Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 80-103. Just as Pocock’s seductive heuristic uncouples the economic from 
the political, there is also in him and his intellectual heirs a quasi-permanent displacement from Florence to the 
Atlantic, which at once marginalizes and masks the local and regional and, thus, the economic. On the economic 
Machiavelli, see especially the important work of Jérémie Barthas, L’argent n’est pas le nerf de la guerre: Essai sur 
une prétendue erreur de Machiavel (Rome: École française de Rome, 2011) and, more recently, idem, “Machiavelli, 
the Republic, and the Financial Crisis” in David Johnston et al., eds., Machiavelli on Liberty and Conflict (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2017), 257-279. Some of the most important new thoughts on Machiavelli, it might be 
added, deal with the issue of class; see for example John M. Najemy, “Society, Class, and State in the Discourses on 
Livy,” in Najemy, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
96-111; idem, “Machiavelli’s Florentine Tribunes,” in Machtelt Israëls and Louis A. Waldman, eds., Renaissance 
Studies in Honor of Joseph Connors, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Milan: Officina Libraria, 2013),65-
72; and John P. McCormick, Machiavellian Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). As Lauro 
Martines long ago concluded, however, “wealth was associated with virtù and honor” in renaissance Florence, 
“poverty with dishonor”, see his The Social World of Florentine Humanists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1963), 25. 
4  Rothschild, “Faith, Enlightenment, and Economics” in Natural Law, Economics, and the Common Good: 
Perspectives from Natural Law, ed. Samuel Gregg and Harold James (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2012), 2-8. For 
some additional context see Maxine Berg and Elizabeth Eger, “The Rise and Fall of the Luxury Debates” in Berg and 
Eger, eds., Luxury in the Eighteenth Century: Debates, Desires and Delectable Goods (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 
7-27. 




them. But was Hume right about the silence of the Italians? In this essay we explore the politics 
(or perhaps the geopolitics) of the transformation of raw wool into finished cloth, using the case 
of Medici entrepreneurs in the sixteenth century. In light of this, we argue that context in the history 
of political economic thought must mean not only the context of other books and ideas but also of 
business practices, and—glancing at an even richer possible future of the field—that the history of 
political economy might well be incomplete without business history.6 If we wish to know what 
Italian Renaissance thinkers had to say about politics, we ourselves cannot be ignorant, pace 
Machiavelli, of the “wool business” and of “profits and losses”. If we wish to hear voices where 
Hume heard nothing, we must attend to the “skillful weavers” and the perfection of pieces of 
“woolen cloth”. 
When Voltaire famously opined that France, overfed with narrative and moral fantasies, 
“around 1750… finally turned to reasoning about grain”, he captured with his usual crispness 
nothing less than the start of an “economic turn” in European Enlightenment thought, a turn 
manifested in step with the emergence of political economy as an increasingly distinct and 
increasingly indispensable science of human affairs at the very heart of which lay the literal 
(especially in France) and metaphorical problem of grain.7 The coming decades witnessed the 
appearance in France of Physiocracy (etymologically the “rule of nature”), an ideology associated 
with the thought of the économistes gathered around the court physician François Quesnay, which 
celebrated agriculture and devalued the urban world, and saw land as a nation’s sole source of 
wealth and clearly superior to “unnatural” and even “sterile” industry. Even though applied 
Physiocracy led disastrously to food shortages, riots, deaths, and political destabilization, its 
influence was long-lived, leaving an indelible imprint on classical economics from its inception.8 
But the Physiocrats were not, of course, the first to weigh the relative merits of agriculture and 
industry in economic terms. This matter was  already in the sixteenth century (if not much earlier) 
 
6 We are, needless to say, not the first to argue this. See, for example, Steven L. Kaplan, Bread, Politics and Political 
Economy in the Reign of Louis XV (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976; 2nd edition, London: Anthem, 2015) and 
Michael Sonenscher, Work and Wages: Natural Law, Politics, and the Eighteenth-Century French Trades 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; second edition 2012) 
7 As argued in Steven L. Kaplan and Sophus A. Reinert, “The Economic Turn in Enlightenment Europe” in Kaplan 
and Reinert, eds., The Economic Turn: Recasting Political Economy in Eighteenth-Century Europe, 2 volumes 
(London: Anthem, 2019), 1-33. For the quotation, see Voltaire, “Bled ou Blé,” in Questions sur l’Encyclopédie, eds. 
Nicholas Cronk and Christiane Mervaud (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2007-2013), volume 3,402-422, at 412-413. 
On the centrality of grain to French political economy, see again Kaplan, Bread, Politics and Political Economy.  




a quintessential problem of political economy avant la lettre. In his internationally best-selling 
1588 On the Causes of the Greatness of Cities, Giovanni Botero devoted considerable attention to 
precisely the question of “which is of greater value for improving a place and increasing its 
population: the fertility of its soil, or the industry of its people?” and his answer, the opening of 
which is quoted at length below, was clear:  
The answer is undoubtedly industry, first of all because the things made by skilled human 
hands are far more numerous and costly than those produced by nature, for nature furnishes 
the material and the subject, but human skill and cleverness impart to them their 
inexpressible variety of forms. Wool is a crude, simple product of nature, but how 
beautiful, manifold and varied are the things that human skill creates from it? How many 
and how great are the profits that result from the industry of those who card it, give it its 
warp and its weft, weave it, dye it, cut it, and sew it, and shape it [la scardassa, l’ordisce, 
la trama, la tesse, la tinge, la taglia, e la cuce, e la forma] in a thousand ways and transport 
it from one place to another?9 
 
Just as Hume more than a century and a half later unmistakably pointed to Venice and Florence 
respectively by invoking shipbuilders and silk and skilled weavers and wool, for Botero’s audience 
the production of wool was tangibly linked to Florence, the wool city par excellence, to its 
greatness (its grandezza), and to industria itself, understood both as a virtue, for men and women 
as for cities, and as an economic process of adding variety and value to nature’s raw materials. The 
Italian cities of Florence, Genoa, and Venice “of whose grandezza there is no need to speak, and 
where the wool and silk industries support almost two-thirds of the inhabitants,” were proof 
enough of the power of industry.10 In making these connections, Botero—the renegade Jesuit of 
Piedmont, secretary to the famed Milanese archbishop Carlo Borromeo, adviser to his nephew 
Federico in Paris and earlier to the Duke of Savoy Carlo Emanuele I, a thinker whose epochal 
 
9 Delle cause della grandezza delle città libri 3 (Rome: Giovanni Martinelli, 1588), 39; the chapter Dell’industria 
(II.7), at 38-43, was removed from later editions and incorporated into Book 8 of Botero’s 1589 Della ragion di stato, 
to which the entire work was afterwards appended beginning with its second edition. We follow the new translation 
of Geoffrey Symcox, On the Causes of the Greatness and Magnificence of Cities, 1588 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2012), 43, which is based on the 1598 text edited in Luigi Firpo, ed., Della ragion di Stato di Giovanni 
Botero: Con tre libri Delle cause della grandezza delle città, due aggiunte e un discorso sulla popolazione di Roma 
(Turin: UTET, 1948), altering it to more literally reflect Botero’s use of the technical language of wool production 
and adding italics for emphasis. 




importance is only now being fully recognized—was not alone.11 
Botero’s extraordinary observation,”[t]he power of industry is such that there is no silver 
mine or gold mine in New Spain and Peru that can be compared to it”, seems to have informed if 
not inspired the 1613 Short Treatise on the Causes that Can Make Kingdoms Abound in Gold and 
Silver even in the Absence of Mines of the jailed Neapolitan writer Antonio Serra,12 whom Joseph 
Schumpeter called “the first to compose a scientific treatise… on Economic Principles and 
Policy”.13 And the eighteenth-century philosopher Ferdinando Galiani, who possessed a rare copy 
of the Short Treatise, explicitly followed Serra’s precocious technical analysis—“If a given piece 
of land is only large enough to sow a hundred tomoli of wheat, it is impossible to sow a hundred 
and fifty there. In manufacturing, by contrast, production can be multiplied not merely twofold but 
a hundredfold, and at a proportionately lower cost”14—in his devastating attack on the Physiocrats 
in his 1770 Dialogues on the Commerce of Grain: “And voilà”, writes Galiani, “the great 
difference between manufactures and agriculture. Manufactures increase with the number of hands 
you put in, while agriculture decreases”.15 And these are just furtive glimpses of what we have 
elsewhere called the “Italian Tradition” of political economy, practiced from the late Middle Ages 
on and first theorized around the turn of the seventeenth century, a tradition that highlighted the 
 
11 Working in the immediate wake of Friedrich Meinecke and Benedetto Croce, Federico Chabod’s study “Giovanni 
Botero” in Opere di Federico Chabod, volume 2: Scritti sul Rinascimento (Turin: Einaudi, 1967 [1934]), 271-458, 
remains a landmark work. For the broader context of Botero’s thought, see especially Robert Bireley, The Counter-
Reformation Prince: Anti-Machiavellianism or Catholic Statecraft in Early Modern Europe (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1990). Apropos of the subject matter of this essay: Michel Senellart, Machiavélisme et raison 
d'état: XIIe-XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1989), 71-83, treats Botero as a mercantilist; Romain 
Descendre, L'état du monde: Giovanni Botero entre raison d'état et géopolitique (Geneva: Droz, 2009), in the finest 
discussion of the Delle cause, 173-212, examines Botero’s political economy, at 186-201. 
12 Botero, Delle cause, 41; On the Causes, 45. On Serra and his Breve trattato delle cause che possono far abbondare 
li regni d'oro e argento dove non sono miniere, see Sophus A. Reinert, “Introduction” to Reinert, ed., A 
“Short Treatise” on the Wealth and Poverty of Nations (1613), trans. Jonathan Hunt (London and New York: Anthem, 
2011), particularly at 37-46 and 65 for an analysis of the relationship between the economic analyses of Botero and 
Serra; and the essays in Rosario Patalano and Sophus A. Reinert, eds., Antonio Serra and the Economics of Good 
Government (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).  
13  A History of Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), 195; immediately following 
Schumpeter, Arthur Cole, librarian of Harvard Business School’s Baker Library, also highlighted Serra’s temporal 
primacy in his The Historical Development of Economic and Business Literature (Boston: Baker Library, 1957),16. 
The polymath Schumpeter similarly declared that “the ‘Malthusian’ Principle of Population sprang fully developed 
from the brain of Botero in 1589”, 254, but see also 143-46. The linkages between Botero and Serra have also been 
explored by [Enzo R. Grilli], Antonio Serra visto da Enzo Grilli (Rome: Luiss University Press, 2006), passim.  
14 Serra, “Short Treatise”, 121.  
15 [Galiani], Dialogues sur le commerce des bleds (London: N.p,, 1770), 150; in the edition of Fausto Nicolini (Milan: 
Ricciardi, 1956), 142. Quoted in Reinert, “Introduction”, 72; for context see Reinert, Translating Empire: Emulation 
and the Origins of Political Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 186-232, and Kaplan, 




individually-competitive and civic benefits of pursuing and protecting high-value-added economic 
activities, such as the production of luxury woolen cloth.16  
* * * 
In January of 1460 a civic debate (pratica) was held in Florence to address a proposal to 
move the Florentine Studio, its under-funded institution of higher learning, to Pisa, which had been 
purchased by the Florentines in 1402 and wholly subjugated four years later. The speech given in 
favor of the move by the prominent lawyer Messer Otto Niccolini, who suggested that a 
university’s proper functions—to train students in classical literature and the humane letters—
were not compatible with the passions and interests of the Florentines, is striking. “This city,” he 
declared, 
indeed from its very origins, has been dedicated to commerce and manufacturing, to 
which it has always devoted all its energies and efforts. Florentines believe that these 
activities are entirely responsible for sustaining and enhancing their republic, for 
ensuring the prosperity and the notable enrichment of private citizens, convinced that 
wealth has led to the growth of its reputation and authority. Putting other occupations 
to one side, they have always dedicated themselves especially to business.17  
 
The business of Florence, put simply, was and would always remain business.  
Although the economy of Renaissance Florence was diverse and pre-modern merchants 
and entrepreneurs tended towards diversification and not specialization in order to guard against 
sector-wide downturns, the most important business in Florence was the production of woolen 
textiles. Woolens were the most important domestic manufacture and export commodity in 
Florence, ca. 1200-1600. Wool textile manufacturing and, more broadly, the cloth and clothing 
sections represented a large share of the Florentine rural and urban economies. In 1480, for 
 
16 “The Italian Tradition of Political Economy: Theories and Policies of Development in the Semi-Periphery of the 
Enlightenment’, in Jomo K. Sundaram and Erik S. Reinert, eds., The Origins of Development Economics: How 
Schools of Economic Thought Have Addressed Development (London: Zed Books, 2005), 24–47. See also Reinert, 
“‘A Sublimely Stupid Idea’: Physiocracy in Italy from the Enlightenment to Fascism,” in Kaplan and Reinert, eds., 
The Economic Turn, 699-733. For a brief survey of the late medieval Italian economy, see Sophus A. Reinert and 
Robert Fredona, “Merchants and the Origins of Capitalism”, in Teresa da Silva Lopes, Christina Lubinski, and Heidi 
Tworek, eds., The Routledge Companion to Makers of Global Business (London: Routledge, 2019), forthcoming.  
17 Gene Brucker, “A Civic Debate on Florentine Higher Education (1460)”, Renaissance Quarterly, no. 34 (1981): 
517-33, at 531; translated by Robert Black, “Education and the Emergence of a Literate Society,” in John M. Najemy, 
ed., Italy in the Age of the Renaissance: 1300-1550 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 18-36, 




example, they dominated the urban shop (bottega) economy, with nearly 8% of all shops, the 
highest for any group, being wool shops; and with nearly 27% dedicated to the cloth trade; very 
significant percentages especially if we keep in mind that a great deal of cloth production was 
done in the countryside and domestically. [FIGURE 1] Profits from the local sale and regional 
and international exportation of woolens enriched Florence, increased its population, funded much 
of the cultural production for which it remains famous, and allowed Florentines to create a 
regional state in Tuscany that remained a major player in geopolitics for centuries. The export of 
woolens also allowed great Florentine families and family-centered partnerships to dominate the 
international banking sector in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, which in turn allowed 
Florentines to capture the English supply of very fine raw wool early in this period. Until its 
decline over the course of the sixteenth century, the Florentine woolen cloth industry sometimes 
outcompeted much larger wool-producing and manufacturing regions in Europe (chiefly England 
and the Low Countries in manufacturing) to dominate some large markets for medium- and high-
quality cloth in Southern Europe, across the Mediterranean basin, and the Near East.18 Thus, the 
Florentine wool industry is an important early case of industry and commercial globalization that 
still has a great deal to tell researchers about international competition, the dynamics of 
comparative advantage, protectionism and state capitalism, and the nature of East-West 
commercial encounters.19 
 Unlike the silk and cotton textile industries, which relied in the earliest instance on the 
long-distance importation of raw materials and which required larger-scale investments to get off 
the ground, the production of woolen cloth emerged organically all across Northern and Central 
Italy out of the traditional techniques and animal and material sources of longue durée domestic 
cloth production, and it dominated the industrial economy of the region, along, for a while, with 
the production of cotton-linen blends (fustians). By the early thirteenth century the production and 
export of cloth had become a global industry. Genoese merchants brought raw wool and dyestuff 
from North Africa, they were turned into low- and mid-quality cloths for mass consumption in 
Milan and the Lombard countryside, and then traded by Florentine cloth merchants all over central 
 
18 Richard Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 
especially pp. 265–340 on Italian cloth production.  
19 See, more generally, Sophus A. Reinert, “Rivalry: Greatness in Early Modern Political Economy,” in Philip J. Stern 
and Carl Wennerlind, eds., Mercantilism Reimagined: Political Economy in Early Modern Britain and its Empire 




Italy or exported to Mediterranean ports, especially Byzantine and Muslim ones, through Genoa. 
Yet Italian wool manufacturers could not, due to technological inferiority and supply constraints, 
compete with the luxury woolens of Flanders and Brabant. On the Provençal market in 1308-9, 
Florentine cloths fetched only around 1/3rd of what the cloths of Ypres did. 20  In the early 
fourteenth century, the merchants of the famous Arte di Calamala in Florence, such as the Del 
Bene company studied in detail by Armando Sapori in one of the early serious business-historical 
case-studies, mostly purchased Northern cloths for resale in other markets. 21  They also 
occasionally added economic value to their products by purchasing undyed and unfinished cloths 
from Northern looms, finishing and dying them in Florence, and exporting them to the Levant, 
relying on their greater proximity to alum and dye supplies to undersell the Flemish in that market. 
Given industrial and supply factors, “panni de Ypro tinti in Florentia”, Ypres cloths dyed in 
Florence, could be more lucrative for Calimala merchants than local cloths.22 The Florentine wool 
industry, as Giovanni Villani famously noted in his Chronicle, saw enormous growth in price per 
cloth and thus value only when it switched focus from the import and export of high-quality 
woolens to the local production of them, which required a steady supply of high-quality raw wool. 
The total production of woolen cloths fell precipitously between 1310 and 1336, the chronicler 
noted, but the later cloths, made from English wool, were worth twice as much as the earlier, which 
were coarse and of low quality.23 The 1330s, before the demographic collapse of the late 1340s, 
represented the high point of Florentine wool production value. [FIGURE 2] It remains unclear to 
what extent this decline was the product of population decline, the shift to smaller-scale but higher-
price cloths, or the contraction of the supply of English wool in relation to fluctuating Royal 
policies and tariffs.24 
 Until gradually surpassed by Spanish merino in the sixteenth century, England was the 
 
20 Roger Aubenais, “Commerce des draps et vie économique à Grasse en 1308-9,” Provence historique 9:37 (1959): 
201-12, 204-206. 
21 Armando Sapori, Una compagnia di Calimala ai primi del trecento (Florence: Olschki, 1932) is a classic case-
study of a Florentine Calimala firm involved in the over-land cloth trade. 
22 Giovanni Filippi, L'arte dei mercanti di Calimala in Firenze ed il suo piu antico statuto (Turin: Fratelli Bocca, 
1889), V, XV, 162. 
23 Giovanni Villani, Nuova Cronica, second edition, ed. Giuseppe Porta (Parma: Guanda, 2007), volume 3, book 12, 
chapter 94, at 197–202. John Najemy has shown, based on Villani’s figures that the labor force of the woolen textile 
industry represented at least 1/6th of Florence’s adult population.  
24 On the demographic collapse, see, among others, W. R. Day, Jr., “The Population of Florence before the Black 




chief producer of the world’s finest raw wool.25 The best English wool was sourced from Lindsay 
and Lincolnshire (Lindisea), the Cotswolds (Contisgualdo), and the Welsh Marches (La Marcia), 
with the Herefordshire town of Leominster providing a common name for it (lana di limistri) in 
the Italian vernacular; it was, by mid-century, precisely these “best of the best” regions that 
supplied the raw wool for Florentine firms.26 After the invention of the foot-operated horizontal 
loom in the Middle Ages, production costs remained relatively steady, and the cost and availability 
of high-quality raw wool were the most important factors in the international trade.27 Due to their 
high value-to-weight ratio, very fine woolens gave merchants a superior profit margin even in 
long-distance maritime and over-land trade, where transportation and protection costs could be 
forbiddingly high for lower-quality cloths.28 Until the third decade of the fourteenth century, 
though, the Italian wool trade centered on the sale of lower quality textiles, and the Low Countries 
dominated the trade in fine wool cloth.29 By the 1320s, though, and taking advantage of the 
disruption of Western European industry caused by endemic warfare, Italian wool manufacturers 
were importing English raw wool of the highest quality directly from Southampton. 30  This 
transformation was also mirrored inside Florence by the simultaneous decline of the once-powerful 
Cloth Merchants’ Guild (Arte di Calimala), whose members had control of Florentine trade at the 
Champagne Fairs, and rise of the Wool Guild (Arte della Lana), whose producer-merchant 
members manufactured and exported woolens internationally. 31  By this time, Florentines 
 
25 John Munro, “Wool Price Schedules and the Qualities of English Wools in the Later Middle Ages,” Textile History 
9 (1978): 118–69; idem, “Medieval Woolens: The Struggle for Markets,” in The Cambridge History of Western 
Textiles, ed. David Jenkins, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1:228–324; idem, “Spanish 
Merino Wools and the Nouvelles Draperies: An Industrial Transformation in the Late-Medieval Low Countries,” 
Economic History Review 58 (2005): 431–84; and Robert S. Lopez, “The Origin of the Merino Sheep,” in The Joshua 
Starr Memorial Volume: Studies in History and Philology (New York: Conference on Jewish Relations, 1953), 161–
68.  
26 Like the Del Bene firm, whose sources are described in Hoshino, L’arte della Lana, table 26, at 216. 
27 On the nature of loom technology, widely speaking, see both Marta Hoffmann, The Warp-Weighted Loom: Studies 
in the History and Technology of an Ancient Implement (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1964) and Walter Endrei, 
L’evolution des techniques du filage et du tissage: du moyen âge à la revolution industrielle (Paris: Mouton, 1968).  
28 John Munro, “I panni di lana,” in Il Rinascimento italiano e l’Europa, ed. Luca Ramin, vol. 4: Commercio e cultura 
mercantile, eds. Franco Franceschi, Richard Goldthwaite, and Reinhold C. Mueller (Treviso: Fondazione Cassamarca, 
2007), 105–41. 
29 Patrick Chorley, “The Cloth Exports of Flanders and Northern France during the Thirteenth Century: A Luxury 
Trade?” Economic History Review, series II, 40 (1987): 349–79. 
30 John Munro,”The ‘Industrial Crisis’ of the English Textile Towns, 1290–1330,” in Thirteenth-Century England, 
VII, eds. Michael Prestwich, Richard Britnell, and Robin Frame (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1999), 103–41. 
31 On the wool guild, see Hidetoshi Hoshino, L’arte della lana in Firenze nel basso medioevo: il commercio della 




dominated both international finance and the incredibly lucrative collection of taxes for the 
Papacy. As a result, powerful “companies” like the Bardi and Peruzzi were able to make extensive 
loans to the English crown, secured by income from English duties on the export of wool.32 The 
“bill of exchange”, invented in medieval Italy, allowed Florentines resident in England to buy 
English wool with English papal taxes and to have their partners resident in Italy give the Pope 
profits from other transactions in lieu of those English taxes.33 By the mid-fourteenth century, three 
quarters of the Florentine wool trade was in fine English wool imported raw to Florence and 
manufactured there for export, and the Arte della Lana came to dominate the long-distance trade 
in high-grade textiles.34 Similarly, Florentine lanaioli, now working with the best wools, were 
better able to emulate the traditionally superior cloths of Northern Europe: in 1341, for example, 
the firm of Cione and Neri Pitti and Co., offered cloths a modo di Borsella (in the style of Brussels), 
a modo di Doagio (Douai) and a modo di Mellino (Mechlin).35 John Munro has cogently argued 
that this transformation also reflected and was causally linked to the decline of the Champagne 
fairs system under the weight of increasing transportation and transaction costs in Western Europe 
as a result of endemic warfare and the decreasing costs of navigation and commercial transport at 
sea.36 Similarly, later in the century, warfare in Northern Italy may have disastrously increased the 
transportation costs for Lombard fustians heading to traditional markets in Southern Germany, 
where new textile industries were then able to emerge.37 Around the turn of the fifteenth century, 
if the accounts of the famed Datini firm of Prato are representative, the market in Spain, 
increasingly an exporter of raw wool, was still very hungry for finished Florentine cloths, with 
more than 30 times as many Florentine as non-Florentine cloths (including those of Prato) being 
 
32  Edwin S. Hunt, The Medieval Super-Companies: A Study of the Peruzzi Company of Florence (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994).  
33 Terence Lloyd, The English Wool Trade in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 60–
140; on the letter of exchange generally, see Raymond de Roover, L’evolution de la lettre de change, XIVe–XVIIIe 
siècles (Paris: A. Colin, 1953). 
34 Hidetoshi Hoshino, “The Rise of the Florentine Woolen Industry in the Fourteenth Century,” in Cloth and Clothing 
in Medieval Europe, eds. N. B. Harte and K.G. Pointing (London: Heinemann, 1983), 184-204, especially 187-190.  
35 Adrienne Atwell, “Ritual Trading at the Florentine Wool-Cloth Botteghe,” in Roger Crum and John Paoletti, eds., 
Renaissance Florence: A Social History (New York: Cambridge University Press , 2006), 182–215, 198.  
36 Munro, “The ‘New Institutional Economics’ and the Changing Fortunes of Fairs in Medieval and Early Modern 
Europe: The Textile Trades, Warfare, and Transaction Costs”, Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 
88 (2001): 1–47. 
37 Maureen Mazzaoui, “The Cotton Industry of Northern Italy in the Late Middle Ages, 1150–1450,” Journal of 




sold at an average of more than double the price.38 
The commercial relationship between England and Florence around high-quality raw wool 
is revealing: Wool was England’s most lucrative export and one of the chief concerns of Royal 
fiscal policy. Until ca. 1400, duties on English wool continued to rise, and since the cost of wool 
was the most important factor in profitability, to decrease profit margins in the international trade. 
Florentines, because of their loans to the crown, were exempt from some of these duties, but even 
with the exemptions, were quickly losing their competitive advantage over England and the Low 
Countries, particularly once the English crown began a policy of systematically favoring the 
export of cloth over raw wool to encourage domestic industry.39 Florentines therefore had to seek 
out other sources of wool. Florentine wool manufacturing firms fell into two distinct classes or 
sectors: the convent of San Martino, which manufactured English wool; and the convents of Garbo 
(in the neighborhoods of San Pancrazio, San Piero Scheraggio, and in the Oltrarno), which 
manufactured wool sourced in Castile, Majorca, Minorca, Provence, and from Italian producers 
(so-called lana matricina). Beginning in 1408 the Arte della Lana demanded a strict separation 
between the two in order to maintain the international reputation of exporters in the San Martino 
cloths.40 Nor did the power of the Arte della Lana end inside the city walls: in the 1420s, the 
Florentines organized the entire Tuscan industry in terms of permitted and forbidden wool 
sources, privileging the capital and prejudicing the production of possibly rival city-industries like 
that of Pisa.41 Such measures meshed nicely with the overall political-economic policies of the 
pre-Medicean Florentine state, which involved, in the words of Franco Franceschi, “support for 
and stimulus of textile manufacturing, regarded as the foundation of the Florentine economy; and 
 
38 Federigo Melis, “La diffusione nel Mediterranea occidentale dei panni di Wervicq e delle altre citta della Lys attorna 
al 1400,” in Studi in onore di Amintore Fanfani, vol. 3: Medioevo (Milan: Giuffré, 1962), 219–43, table 4, at 229 
dealing with period 1394 to 1410.  
39 Lloyd, English Wool Trade, 225-287. See, on this transition, and the long shadow it cast on the history of Italian 
political economy, Reinert “Blaming the Medici: Footnotes, Falsification, and the Fate of the ‘English Model’ in 
Eighteenth-Century Italy,” History of European Ideas 32 (2006): 430-455 and “Lessons on the Rise and Fall of Great 
Powers: Conquest, Commerce, and Decline in Enlightenment Italy”, The American Historical Review 115 (2010): 
1395-1425. 
40 Franco Franceschi, “Lane permesse e lane proibite nella Toscana fiorentina dei secoli XIV-XV: logiche economiche 
e scelte ‘politiche'“, in La pastorizia mediterranea: Storia e diritto, eds. Antonello Mattone and Pinuccia F. Simbula 
(Rome: Caracci, 2011), 878-89. For other regulations, see Franco Franceschi, “Criminalità e mondo del lavoro: il 
tribunale dell’Arte della lana a Firenze nei secoli XIV e XV,” Ricerche storiche 18 (1988): 551–90; see also 
Goldthwaite, Economy, pp. 276-78 on the different sectors. 
41 Franco Franceschi, “Industria, commercio, credito” in Storia della civiltà Toscana, volume 2, Il Rinascimento 




protectionism on a massive scale to regulate in- and outflows”.42  
By the late 1480s, after a steady decline in the availability of English wool, the Garbo 
sector in Florence was dominant, at least in terms of production volume, with less than 25% of the 
total cloths produced based on English wool.43 It was around the same time that Spanish wool 
began to overtake matricina, both in price and in volume, in Florentine production. By the end of 
the fifteenth century, Spanish merino wool was beginning to rival English wool in quality and 
became an essential part of the Florentine luxury woolens trade. After the mid-fifteenth century, 
the most important markets for Florentine garbo cloths were Ottoman territories in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the panni di levante shipped eastward were made from matricina and  from the 
wool of Castile.44 By the 1470s as much as half of the total production of the Garbo section was 
bound for the Levant, and this market helped revive the Florentine woolens industry, in a slump 
since the second half of the fourteenth century, even though San Martino cloths remained popular 
in domestic and luxury markets.45 The Florentine-Ottoman trade was fostered in the later period 
by the peaceful diplomacy of Lorenzo de’ Medici with the Turks, including the Sultans Mehmed 
II and Bayezid II, and the opening up of new overland routes to compete with shipping from the 
Florentine ports of the Tyrrhenian Sea.46 Yet the late 1520s saw another serious downturn in the 
Florentine woolens industry, the product of plague, war (Rome would be sacked in 1527), more 
competition and higher prices for Spanish wool, and, very possibly, the rapidly diminishing Levant 
trade. Though silk was by this point coming largely from local and Western sources, Sultan Selim 
I’s 1514-20 embargo on the import of Persian silk into Ottoman lands played havoc with the 
Western trade at Bursa, where raw silk had once been lucratively traded for finished Florentine 
woolens, and which would soon lose its central role in the East-West cloth trade to Aleppo, giving 
 
42 Franco Franceschi, “Medici Economic Policy” in The Medici: Citizens and Masters, eds. Robert Blacke and John 
E. Law (Florence: Villa I Tatti, 2015), 129-154, 143. Discussing a series of import bans on foreign fabrics between 
1439 and 1458, Franceschi quotes a telling justification, “it will not be believed elsewhere that the textiles of Florence 
are satisfactory if we ourselves use foreign imports,” at 147.  
43 Hoshino, L'arte dela Lana in Firenze, 231-244. 
44 Hidetoshi Hoshino, “Il commercio fiorentino nell’Impero Ottomano: costi e profitti negli anni 1484–1488,” in 
Aspetti della vita economica medievale: Atti del Convegno di Studi nel X anniversario della morte di Federigo Melis 
(Florence, 1985), 81-90; Maureen Mazzaoui, “Ottoman Markets for Florentine Woolen Cloth in the Late Fifteenth 
Century,” International Journal of Turkish Studies 3 (1985–86): 17–31. 
45 Chorley, “Rascie and the Florentine Cloth Industry,” 489. 
46 Lorenzo Tanzini, “Il Magnifico e il Turco. Elementi politici, economici e culturali nelle relazioni tra Firenze e 





an advantage to the Venetians over the Genoese and Florentines.47  
* * * 
 The scale, industrialization, and centralization of Florence’s late medieval wool industry 
became an essential issue in economic historiography when Alfred Doren, at the turn of the 
twentieth century and in a monumental volume subtitled “a contribution to the history of modern 
capitalism”, presented, on the basis of chiefly normative sources like guild statutes, premodern 
Florentine lanaioli (manufacturer-merchants of woolen cloth) as highly-organized, large-scale 
“supercapitalists” with partly centralized control over labor and production in their workshops: in 
his terms, industrial magnates (Industriemagnaten) with a huge accumulation of capital (gewaltige 
Anhäufung von Kapital) and of great capital (Großkapital) and with enormous economic power 
(ungeheure wirtschaftliche Machtmittel), in control of the guild of great industrialists par 
excellence (die Zunft der der Großindustrielle κατʼ εξοχήν).48 In a long note in the later 1916-19 
edition of his Modern Capitalism, Werner Sombart, who along with his near exact contemporary 
and critic Max Weber shaped the debate on the origins of capitalism in the first half of the twentieth 
century, rebelled again Doren’s view, declaring wool firms in the city “essentially craft-based 
(handwerksmäßige) or at best small capitalist (kleinkapitalistische) enterprises”, adding: 
“Nowhere do we find the beginnings of large-scale enterprises. Any operations exceeding the 
dimensions of individual enterprises were built by the guild (e.g. the Tuchspannen),” the lattermost 
term being a reference to large structures for wool stretching (tiratoi), of which there were four in 
late-sixteenth-century Florence.49 Sombart was right. Wool manufacturing in Florence—which 
 
47 Chorley, “Rascie,” 487-91, and Halil İnalcık, “Part I: The Ottoman State: Economy and Society, 1300-1600,” in 
İnalcık, ed., An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 9-410, 218-256.  
48 Doren, Studien aus der Florentiner Wirtschaftsgeschichte, volume 1:Die Florentiner Wollentuchindustrie vom 14. 
bis zum 16. Jahrhundert: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des modernen Kapitalismus (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'sche, 1901); 
quotations from202, 400, and 469; and from volume 2, Das Florentiner Zunftwesen vom 14. bis zum 16. Jahrhundert 
(1908),505, 560, and 721. Early caveats about Doren’s methodology were presented by, among others, Edwin F. Gay, 
soon to be first Dean of Harvard Business School, in his long review in Political Science Quarterly 19 (1904): 310-
315. “Doren bases all this on gild documents, which he uses with dexterity and vivacity,” Gay writes, “[b]ut this 
vivacity has its dangers”,314. On the scale of the Florentine wool industry, see also the important early revisionism 
of Gertrud Hermes, “Der Kapitalismus in der Florentiner Wollenindustrie,” Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Staatswissenschaft 72 (1917): 367-400. 
49  Sombart, Der moderne Kapitalismus: Historisch-systematische Darstellung des gesamteuropäischen 
Wirtschaftslebens von seinen Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, volume 2, part 2 (Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 1919),767. 
On Sombart and Weber, see Hartmut Lehmann, “The Rise of Capitalism: Weber versus Sombart”, in Lehmann and 





remained in essential ways the same from the fourteenth through the sixteenth centuries—was 
largely decentralized due to the proto-industrial system in place there, commonly called the 
“putting out” system. Wool was initially distributed to and worked by artisans, often women on 
the borders of Florence or in the countryside, in their own homes using their own tools. The wool 
was then collected and distributed to urban weavers and dyers.50  Very little of the labor or 
production was centralized in a central workshop (Doren’s zentralwerkstatt), and most occurred 
outside of direct oversight. Nearly all of the workers in the system earned piecework pay, rather 
than wages, and the presence of large numbers of precariously-situated urban woolworkers in the 
city had been a significant cause of political agitation in the second half of the fourteenth century.51 
The consequences of this unrest led to decreasing (not increasing) centralization in the Florentine 
woolen cloth industry,52 which did survive the political strife, the demographic collapse of the 
Black Death, and significant regional depressions, but ultimately fell victim to international 
competition. Our image of the scale of the industry is now quite clear: the well-known and 
relatively large Del Bene firm, studied by the great Japanese business historian Hidetoshi Hoshino, 
produced (using over 98% English wool) an average of around 155 cloths per year in the period 
1355-59 and, in its best year, had a profit margin of 40% before a sudden downturn in its business. 
[FIGURE 3]. And Franco Franceschi has found, on the basis of production totals for 402 firms, 
that the average in precisely this period (1355-74) was 122 cloths per annum.53 The Arte della 
Lana was, as Doren had argued, controlled by the interests of the lanaioli, the full-members or 
artefices pleno iure of the guild, but they had likely never been, as in Flanders, master weavers or 
loom-operators, but instead were and remained petty industrial entrepreneurs whose role in 
manufacturing was largely restricted to continuous processes of capital generation and 
management.  
 
50 For a study of one production system, see Francesco Ammannati, “Francesco di Marco Datini’s Wool Workshops,” 
in Francesco di Marco Datini: The Man and the Merchant, ed. Giampiero Nigro (Florence: University of Florence 
Press, 2010), 489–514. On proto-industrialization more generally, see Sheilagh C. Ogilvie and Markus Cerman, eds., 
European Proto-Industrialization (Cambridge, 1996). 
51 The literature on woolworker agitation is vast, but see Alessandro Stella, La révolte des Ciompi: les hommes, les 
lieux, le travail (Paris: Editions EHESS, 1993) and, for a wider context, Samuel Cohn, “Florentine Insurrections, 
1342–1385, in Comparative Perspective,” in The English Rising of 1381, eds. Rodney H. Hilton and T. H. Aston 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 143-164; on the organization of labor in the wool guild, see Franco 
Franceschi, Oltre il ‘Tumulto’: I lavoratori fiorentini dell’Arte della Lana fra Tre- e Quattrocento (Florence: Olschki, 
1993).  
52  Franco Franceschi, “L’imposa mercantile industriale nella Toscana dei secoli XIV–XVI,” Annali di storia 
dell’impresa 14 (2003): 229–49.  




 An unusually auspicious confluence of women, men, and institutional support in the 1930s 
led to the earliest extensive use of a firm’s account books to understand the business-historical and 
entrepreneurial dynamics of Renaissance wool manufacturing. And it was this approach that, 
practically speaking, consigned Doren’s view to obsolescence and spurred much of the most 
vibrant premodern business-historical research of the twentieth century. The shift in approach 
came, like a bolt, with the publication in 1941 of the young Belgian business historian Raymond 
de Roover’s essay “A Florentine Firm of Cloth Manufacturers”, which had been written while he 
was an MBA student at Harvard Business School, working under N.S.B. Gras, holder of the first 
chair in business history and architect of HBS’s business history curriculum, and submitted 
originally as a thesis for a Harvard University prize in 1938.54 De Roover’s “fresh perspective” in 
the article, “led to a major revision in our understanding of the organization of the cloth industry 
in Florence”, according to Richard Goldthwaite, by focusing on the “actual business practice of an 
individual firm” and by “de-emphasing the guild and revealing the considerable fluidity in human 
relations inside the system and therefore the more amorphous quality of industrial society” in the 
Renaissance.55 De Roover would go on to become, in the words of David Herlihy, “the historian 
sans pair of medieval business and banking institutions”, his reputation having been secured in 
perpetuum with his 1963 masterpiece The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank. De Roover’s 
preliminary investigation of the Medici bank had been published 15 years earlier and dedicated to 
Gras, “whose teaching inspired this study on one of the most famous business firms in history”,56 
and there is no doubt that De Roover’s background in accounting—he had been an accountant in 
Antwerp before emigrating to the United States—and training in business methods under Gras 
were the together foundation of his extraordinary talents and productivity. But the “Florentine 
 
54 “A Florentine Firm of Cloth Manufacturers: Management and Organization of a Sixteenth-Century Business”, 
Speculum 16.1 (1941): 3-33, reprinted in Julius Kirshner, ed., Business, Banking, and Economic Thought in Late 
Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Selected Studies of Raymond de Roover (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
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Reinert, “The Harvard Research Center in Entrepreneurial History and the Daimonic Entrepreneur”, History of 
Political Economy 49 (2017): 267-314. 
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Kirshner, ed., Business, Banking, and Economic Thought, 3-14, 10-11.  
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Firm” was based, more immediately, on the work of another scholar, Florence Edler de Roover, 
who, before meeting Raymond in Antwerp and marrying him in England in 1936, had worked 
under Gras’s supervision on a project funded by the Medieval Academy of America to prepare a 
lexicon of medieval Italian business terms, the detailed appendices of which, based on her 
extensive use of the collection of Medici family business manuscripts (focused on cousins of the 
more famous branch of the Medici dynasty that was comprised of bankers, Popes, and later Grand 
Dukes of Tuscany) donated to HBS by the Anglo-American retail magnate Harry Gordon 
Selfridge, laid the groundwork for Raymond’s study.57 That Edler de Roover’s extraordinary 
paleographical skills permitted her husband to reconstruct the account books of the “Florentine 
Firm” is without doubt, just as her discovery of the libri segreti (secret books) of the Medici bank 
laid the groundwork for his magnum opus.58  This essay, in returning to the same Selfridge 
manuscript books used by Edler in her Glossary and De Roover in a “Florentine Firm”, is similarly 
based upon the couple’s pioneering efforts. 
* * * 
In his classic The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, Raymond de Roover devoted one 
chapter to “the Medici as industrial entrepreneurs”, examining the main branch’s investment in 
three cloth manufacturing botteghe, two wool and one silk. These shops were not, compared to the 
family’s banking activities, a large source of profits; in the period 1420-35, for example, the one 
wool shop then operating provided only 3.1% of the bank’s profits.59 But De Roover’s idea of 
industrial entrepreneurship provides us with a model for presenting a case study of a single Medici 
wool firm’s operations. Compared to some of the other wool manufacturing firms in the Selfridge 
Collection, the 1556-8 firm of Francesco di Giuliano di Raffaello de’Medici and Co., which 
produced only 71 woolen cloths, was relatively small. The survival of nearly all of its account 
books, however,  allows for the fullest reconstruction of a firm from the Medici branch represented 
 
57  Florence Edler, Glossary of Mediaeval Terms of Business, Italian series, 1200-1600 (Cambridge, MA: The 
Mediaeval Academy of America, 1934), appendices at 333-426. On Edler [de Roover], see Richard A. Goldthwaite, 
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by the collection. All but one (a book of weavers) of the firm’s eight account books, purchased as 
a set in 1556 from the firm of stationers (cartolai) Giovanbattista Fontani and Co. for 48 lire di 
piccioli (6.86 florins),60 are extant. [FIGURE 4].61 These books were organized hierarchically, 
with the ledger (“debtors and creditors” book), in which the tally of sold cloths (panni finiti) 
functioned to calculate profits and losses, as the book of final entry into which fed two sub-systems 
of books, one dealing with the direct costs of manufacturing (Filatori, Tessitori, Tintori e 
Lavoranti, Manifattori) and the other with the operation’s indirect costs and cash expenditures 
(Quadernaccio, Entrata e Uscita e Quaderno di Cassa, and Giornale). [FIGURE 5 shows the middle 
volume] Like nearly all the wool companies of the period, the firm itself, which operated for the 
two years from 1 May 1556 to 30 April 1558, was little more than a small core of employees and 
an amount of capital. The firm rented its bottega and equipment and had only four salaried 
employees62:  
• Rosso di Giovanni de’ Medici, maruffino, 2 year term beginning 1 May 1556, salary of f.40/year, 
who kept the firm’s books  
• Amerigo di Giovanni de’ Medici, giovane, 18 month term beginning 1 November 1556, salary of 
f.16/year 
• Francesco di Piero Tucci, giovane, 13 month term beginning 1 November 1556, salary of f.20/year 
• Antonio d’Agnolo fornaio, fattorino, 6 month term beginning 1 November 1556, salary of f.6/year  
A breakdown of the firm’s total operating costs of 3,076.75 florins is found in [FIGURE 6], which 
also serves as a basic schematic of the entire manufacturing process (from preparation to spinning 
to weaving to dying to finishing).63 The 1556-58 firm was not profitable, but its overall costs 
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(excluding the cost of raw wool, see below) were not unlike other Medici firms, even much larger 
ones. [FIGURE 7] shows the two Medici firms operating in the period 1530-43, respectively more 
than five and fifteen times the size in total output.  
The firm was operated by Francesco’s father Giuliano, for whom we have in the Selfridge 
collection an extant set of richordanze beginning with his 1547 marriage to Margherita, the 
daughter of Giovanni de’ Nerli, who brought him a 2,700 florin dowry. In them, Giuliano 
additionally records family milestones—the births and baptisms of his children, first Costanza, 
then Francesco (so-named “to reinstate the name of Francesco my uncle and Francesco my 
brother”), Caterina, and Giovanni (named for his father-in-law), who died in his ninth month; and 
the deaths of Margherita at age 33 and of his father, both in 1555—and civic honors, from his 
service as Podestà of Montepoli in the Arno valley and as consul of the Arte della Lana to his 
election to the Otto di Pratica and Dodici Buonuomini, by this point two magistracies in the Ducal 
administration of Tuscany. 64  Giuliano’s memoranda also included a number of property 
transactions and were kept at the end of a giornale containing accounts of chiefly personal or 
 
the operating costs of the Medici firm in question would be valued at $449,451.64 today by a Gold Index. The 
purchasing power of gold has, however, changed significantly over time. As Goldthwaite shows in The Building of 
Renaissance Florence: An Economic and Social History (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 438, 
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domestic business, with about one quarter of all entries in the first two years of his marriage to 
Margherita pertaining to his wife’s expenses.65 Giuliano himself would die in 1569 at the age of 
63. 
At the start of May 1556, the merchant Jacopo Pandolfi sold the firm its first supplies of 
raw material, eleven bales of Spanish wool “of varying types (di piu sorte)” with a combined 
weight, including ropes and packaging, of 3,214 pounds. The firm paid f.10 s.10 per 100 pounds, 
which was calculated after the subtraction of combined tare (“tara per tutte le tare #297”) equal to 
9.25% of the weight, or f.306 s.5 total for a nominal weight of 2,917 pounds.66 This wool was 
unpacked, likely in the firm’s bottega, and sorted into 22 sacks (of variable weight, ranging from 
125 to 160 pounds) with a combined weight of 3,110 pounds.67 In 1556-7 the firm acquired around 
8,675 pounds of raw wool all told, of which approximately 63% was Spanish and the rest Italian 
(Tuscan matricina and wool from castroni, castrated bucks), which was sorted into 60 sacks and, 
in the case of the Italian wool though not the Spanish, graded (as fina, seconda, or grossa). The 
purchase of raw wool accounted for 30% of the total production costs of this firm, by far the largest 
single category, even though it was lower than the 35% and 44% spent on wool by the related 
Medici firms operating from 1530-43 and by the Brandolini firm examined by Richard 
Goldthwaite at 40%. The Spanish lana della serena supplied by the Spaniard Lopez Gallo, which 
made up more than a quarter of the total, was by far the most expensive at f.24 s.10 per hundred 
pounds followed by Italian wool shorn from castrated sheep at f.13 per hundred pounds. [FIGURE 
8] The raw wool purchased in the period 1491-5 by the Medici firm of Giuliano di Giovenco and 
his son Francesco, “wool manufacturers in Porta Rossa”, included both matricina and garbo, from 
local merchants—among them the wealthy and influential Jacopo di Giovanni Salviati, who was 
married to Lorenzo de’ Medici’s daughter Lucrezia, sister of the future pope Leo X, and a number 
of his relatives—and from Spaniards resident in Florence like Miguel de Miranda, Miguel de Silos, 
and Fernando and Juan de Castro.68 Raw wool was delivered in bales, wrapped in cloth and tied 
with rope, and distinguished in accounts by gross weight (e.g., “one bale gross weight 237 
 
65 Ms. 562, ff. 1r-4v.  
66 Ms. 600 (5), f.1r. The individual tare, found at 568 (9), f. 1r, were 133 lbs. per le sache, 26 per uso, 16 per umido, 
and 122 per sabione. 
67 Ms. 567 (7), f. 1r.  
68 Ms. 516, ff. 3r-19v; 1r, “lanaiuoli in Porta Roxa”; 2r (Salviati), 4v (Michele de Miranda), 9r (Michele de Silos), 




pounds”); the final purchase price (netto a pagamento) was calculated by the pound after the 
assessment of tares (tare), allowances for ordinary wear-and-tear (per uso), for humidity or 
wetness, dirt or sand, and the weight of the ropes and packaging materials. So, for example, when 
on 18 July 1492 Miguel de Silos delivered six bales of wool weighing 1381 pounds to the Medici 
partners, the tares combined for 117 pounds (nearly 8.5% of the total), and the final price (f. 145, 
s. 6) reflected a weight of 1264 pounds.69 The 1552-5 notebook of first-entry (quadernaccio) of 
Giuliano di Giovenco’s great-great-grandson Giuliano di Raffaello’s firm similarly shows the 
Medici wool manufacturer sourcing raw wool from a variety of sources. Six decades on, Spaniards 
were even more common as suppliers of raw wool, both Spanish and Italian matricina, and notably 
also as buyers of finished cloths: one Luis de Polanco, for example, sold the Medici wool from 
central Italy (matricina di toschanella) and bought both undyed cloths (panni bianchi) and smooth 
black rascie, the most expensive cloths sold by the Medici in the sixteenth century; while Lopez 
Gallo, who supplied raw Spanish wool, bought lower quality coarse cloths (panni corsivi), both 
undyed (bianchi) and dyed blue and pink (turchino, roseseche), as well as undyed twill (lana alla 
piana) and again especially the fine black rascie. These Spaniards specialized in selling wool, but 
that was not all; in August of 1563, for example, Juan Alonso de Malvenda sold Giuliano di 
Raffaello and Co. sugar from the Canary Islands (zuchero di canaria), where the Spaniards had 
introduced sugar cane at the end of the previous century, and larger quantities of lower-quality 
sugar from India (zucheri rottami d’India).70 In 1556, the same Lopez Gallo bartered his raw wool 
for some of the black rascie it would produce, or 1000 pounds of the finest Spanish wool for 3 b 
bolts of rascia together weighing 201 pounds and valued at 222.74 florins, a weight-value ratio of 
about 5 to 1 between the raw material and the manufactured good.71 In the period 1490-1550, 
studied by Bruno Dini, the Salviati firm did business with some 26 Spanish merchants; of them, 
more than half either broke even (bartering goods for goods—60% of the time Spanish raw wool, 
and 32% of the time Spanish silk, for finished Silks and woolens) or ended up with a negative 
 
69 Ibid., 9r, “ia balla peso lorda lib. 237”.  
70 Ms. 563, ff. 2rv, 31v, 32v, 35v, 40v (Luigi di Polancho), 19v, 23r, 32rv (Lopes Ghallo), and 62v-63r (Giannalonso 
di Malvenda). Bruno Dini, “Mercanti spagnoli a Firenze (1480–1530),” in idem, Saggi su un economia-mondo: 
Firenze e l’Italia fra Mediterraneo ed Europa (secc. XIII–XVI) (Pisa: Pacini, 1995), 289–310, provides an overview 
of the Spanish merchant colony in Florence in the earlier period. 
71 Note that, in the context of the sixteenth-century Florentine wool trade, “barter” (a transaction a baratto) is not a 
direct exchange of one good for another but a market exchange because the parties always assigned a monetary value 




balance with the Salviati. [FIGURE 9].72 In addition to wool, this firm directly purchased a number 
of other supplies, including some of the dyestuffs used in the dying process; these included, as the 
company’s ledger records, “various red dyes, orchil, and others to dye this firm’s cloths (piu 
robbie, oricello, e altro per tignere i panni di questa ragione)”.73 Other necessary supplies for the 
manufacturing and finishing processes included soap and, costliest of all, oil, for 22.5 barrels of 
which the Medici paid l.373 s.19 d.0 total and which they purchased over a period of 14 months 
from “various oil sellers (piu oliandoli)” at prices ranging from l.13 s.5 d.0 to l.18 s.14 d.0 di 
piccioli per barrel.74  
In addition to wool quality, dying and final color historically had strongly affected the 
quality and price of sold textiles, and the cost of dying was itself affected by the quality of the 
dyestuffs being used, the quality of the wool being dyed, and whether the cloths needed to be dyed 
only once or re-dyed to produce the final color.75 An exemplary case of the role played by the 
dyestuffs themselves relates to the etymology of the word “scarlet”. John Munro has amply shown 
that, before it was an adjective referring to the bright red-orange color, “scarlet” signified the most 
expensive and luxurious woolen cloth of the Middle Ages, in Italy called scarlatto di grana, which 
was produced with the finest English wool and the red dye kermes, commonly called “grain” or 
grana and derived from the tiny, dried eggs of Mediterranean shield lice.76 In a 1339 statute, the 
 
72 In a striking passage in the original Christie’s catalogue for the sale of the Medici ledgers which Selfridge bought 
and eventually donated to HBS, the auction house noted “the middle of the sixteenth century saw a sharp decline in 
the Spanish cloth industry, and it is interesting to find that the Florentine looms had obtained such an ascendancy, that 
wool was brought from Spain to be manufactured into cloth that at once returned to the country which had produced 
the raw material”, see Catalogue of the Medici Archives… which will be sold by Messrs. Christie, Manson and 
Woods… (London: W. Clowes and Sons [1919?]), 185. On the institutionalization of this strategy in the European 
world, see Reinert, “Rivalry”. 
73 Ms. 567(8), f.34, and see also ff. 23v-24r.; orchil (oricello) is a lichen-based violet dye. 
74 Ms. 567 (11), ff. 5v-6r. 
75 For a basic introduction to dying in late medieval and Renaissance Florence, see Piero Guarducci, Tintori e tinture 
nella Firenze medieval (secc. XIII-XV) (Florence: Polistampa, 2005) and see also, for a fine case study of a Sienese 
dyer, idem, Un tintore senese del Trecento: Landoccio di Cecco d’Orso (Siena: Protagon, 1998). 
76 John H. Munro, “The Medieval Scarlet and the Economics of Sartorial Splendour,” in Cloth and Clothing in 
Medieval Europe: Essays in Memory of Professor E. M. Carus-Wilson, eds. Negley B. Harte and Kenneth G. Ponting 
(London: Heinemann [Pasold Research Fund], 1983), 13-70, at 13-21 and passim; Munro, “Scarlet”, in Encyclopedia 
of Dress and Textiles in the British Isles, c. 450-1450, eds. Gale R. Owen-Crocker et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 477-81, 
at 477-78. On the basis of scientific testing of an extant cloth sample, Dominique Cardon established beyond a doubt 
the character of the dyestuff employed in scarlets; see Cardon, “Échantillons de draps de laine des Archives Datini 
(fin XIVe siècle, début XVe siècle): Analyses techniques, importance historique”, Mélanges de l'Ecole française de 
Rome: Moyen-Age, no. 103 (1991): 359-372. For further details on kermes (from the shield louse Kermes vermilio, 
formerly Coccus ilicis), see Costanza Perrone da Zara, “Aspetti storici e tecnici della tintura nel Medioevo e nel 





Florentine Arte di Calimala promulgated strict guidelines for maintaining the unique, luxury status 
of scarlatti: authentic scarlatti, called scarlatti di colpo, had to be dyed from white or an 
intermediate shade of grey only with the red dye kermes, which itself cost more than 1/3rd of the 
total cost of production in the early fourteenth century, while cloths dyed with a mixture of kermes 
and madder, a cheaper vegetal dye called robbia in the Tuscan vernacular, had to be sold as 
scarlattini or panni di mezzagrana.77  
Dying was a craft (an arte), but it was also a chemical process requiring, in addition to the 
dyestuffs, the application of heat and use of mordants or fixants in order to make the finished cloths 
colorfast, i.e. with colors resistant to running or fading. Inexpensive and locally-available mordants 
included tree bark and, especially in woad dying, wood ash, with its high alkalinity, but high-
quality dying, especially with vibrant reds, increasingly came to rely on chemical mordants like 
gromma (Potassium bitartrate, or cream of tartar), a byproduct of winemaking, and, especially, 
allume (alum), of which several types were known, the best being the so-called allume di 
rocca (potassium alum, or the potassium double sulfate of aluminium).78 The demand for allume 
di rocca could be great—and acquiring it even played a role in the decision of Lorenzo de’ Medici, 
then the de facto prince of the Republic of Florence, to participate in the sack Volterra in 1472 
after its leaders reneged on a concession of its newly discovered alum deposits79—as reflected in 
the amounts required for a dying firm’s annual operations: in the year between July of 1498 and 
1499, for example, in addition to dyes including robbia, oricello, and scòtano, and smaller amounts 
of gromma, the firm of Raffaello di Francesco de’ Medici and Co., tintori d’arte maggiore, 
purchased from the Arte della Lana more than 24,000 pounds of allume di rocca (potassium alum) 
for a total of f.288 s.4 d.3 at a rate of 12 florins per 1000 pounds.80  
 
77 Hidetoshi Hoshino, “La tintura di grana nel basso medioevo,” in idem, Industria tessile e commercio internazionale 
nella Firenze del tardo Medioevo, eds. Franco Franceschi and Sergio Tognetti (Florence: Olschki, 2001), 23-39, at 
24-26. The long, red roots of the common madder (i.e., rubia tinctorum, “dyers’ red”), usually sourced from Lombardy 
and Flanders, was the most common red dye used in the premodern woolens industry.  
78 Franco Franceschi, “Il ruolo dell’allume nella manifattura tessile toscana dei secoli XIV-XV”,  
Mélanges de l’École française de Rome: Moyen Âge no. 126.1 (2014): 159-70; see, on the connection between wine 
and gromma, sometimes also called allume di feccia, see Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, La Pratica della mercatura, 
ed. Allan Evans (Cambridge, MA: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1936), 380. 
79 Enrico Fiume, L’impresa di Lorenzo de’ Medici contro Volterra (1472), Florence: Olschki, 1948), 167-171; on 
which see Lorenzo Fabbri, “L'impresa di Enrico Fiumi contro Lorenzo de'Medici”, Rassegna volterrana no. 84 
(2007): 33-44.  
80 For the firm’s main supplies, see Ms. 546, ff. 4v-7r, 42v-43r, 58v-59r, 61v-62r, and 86v-87r. The firm’s total alum 




In order to produce a wider range of final colors, Florentine lanaioli relied on the layering 
of colors, with a first and second stage of dying. The first stage was often performed by tintori di 
guado, dyers who used woad, a vegetal indigo dye, to produce a wide range of blues and who often 
dyed “in the wool” as well as in the thread or in the finished cloth. The range of blue hues common 
in Tuscan sources went from allazzato (very light) to turchino to sbiadato (etymologically linked 
to our word “blue”) to cilestro to perso (very dark). The second stage, generally done in the 
finished cloth, was executed by tintori d’arte maggiore, dyers who performed the more important 
part of the dying process, using a variety of dyestuffs, among which reds commonly 
predominated.81 The large chromatic range available to Florentine lanaioli, and the two-stage 
dying process sometimes used, can be seen by looking at the cloths produced by the 1531-34 wool 
manufacturing firm of Raffaello di Franceco de’ Medici. [FIGURE 10] depicts the intermediate 
and final colors of the cloths sold by the firm in the terminology employed in its end-of-period 
ricordo of sold cloths. Only 8.4% of the cloths remained undyed. Nearly 56% of the cloths were 
dyed blue, of these some 18% remained sky blue (cilestro), 30% were dyed red after being dyed 
cilestro to produce a final black (nero), and 42% went from sbiadato to paonazzo (a popular dark 
purple) or to dark shades of green. The remaining 36% ended up as greys, tans, yellows, oranges, 
and a mix of other colors. The firm of this case study, Francesco de’ Medici and Co., outsourced 
the dying of its cloths, which represented a little over 10% of its total operational costs, to five 
outside firms. [FIGURE 11] The data for the arte maggiore dying is incomplete, but the guado 
firms, as expected, charged more for darker shades of blue and for dying higher quality cloths. The 
costliest procedure was dying so-called rascia cloth sky blue in order to then be dyed a second 
time or over-dyed, probably with a mix of kermes and madder, in order to produce the most sought-
after cloth on the mid-sixteenth century Florentine market, rascia nera, or black rascia. Quality of 
cloth was a crucial variable: the cost of dying a rascia cloth sky-blue resulted in a 36% cost 
increase over dying a perpignano the same color. The gradual shift from the predominance of blues 
in the fifteenth century to more costly, twice-dyed blacks in the sixteenth, was naturally the result 
of changes in fashion, but the intervention of the Arte della Lana had also been crucial. Florentine 
rascie, plausibly deriving their name from the city of Raška in Serbia, were originally intentionally 
 
81 On the medieval guado and indigo dye (from the flowering plant Isatis tinctoria), see Perrone, “Aspetti storici”, 
112. For the range of shades in the mid-Trecento, see Hoshino, La tintura di grana”, 28. A similar range is found in a 
fifteenth-century dyers’ manual from the Veneto that has been edited by Giovanni Rebora, Un manuale di tintura del 




developed as an import substitution measure to compete with the so-called rascie di schiavonia 
that were of a surprisingly high quality and were entering the Florentine market in the mid-fifteenth 
century. In February of 1488, the Arte, considering the invasion of foreign cloths, decided to forbid 
the sale of Slavic rascie and to encourage the manufacturing of native rascie by instituting 
production quotas. The Arte had similarly encouraged, in 1418, the production of perpignani 
cloths, a kind of light and elastic serge commonly used for making men’s hosiery, named for the 
cloths of Perpignan, and made from Spanish garbo and local Italian wools, which was the major 
Florentine textile of the fifteenth century and again in the seventeenth, when the cheaper fabric 
entirely overtook rascia. But it was the production of black rascie that, almost alone, contributed 
to the spike in the 1560s evident in FIGURE 2 and for the first time allowed Florentine cloths to 
penetrate ultramontane markets.82  
Once wool was purchased and sorted, the firm of Francesco di Giovanni di Giunta and Co., 
“washers at the canal (lavatori alla gora)”, was hired to wash the sorted raw wool in an industrial 
canal and paid a flat rate of l.1 di piccioli per hundred pounds of washed wool in addition to being 
compensated for the alum used in the process at a rate of l.20 di piccioli per hundred pounds. On 
Saturday 2 May 1556, for example, the washers received the first twelve sacks of Jacopo Pandolfi’s 
Spanish wool weighing 1660 pounds. The washed wool weighed 1350 pounds, representing a loss 
of 18.7% of the original weight (near the average of 19.45% loss), and the washing cost l.13 s.10 
piccioli, paid along with l.12 for the 60 pounds of alum used.83 All told, 6630 pounds (final weight) 
were washed and returned to the Medici in 1556-7. The washed wool was then entrusted to Battista 
di Pasquino da Bacchereto, a kind of foreman in the Medici operation called a capodieci (i.e., one 
nominally in charge of ten workers), who distributed the wool for picking, beating, and cleaning 
(a process called divettatura, from vetta, a stick or pole used to strike the wool); collected it, and 
sent it on for further work. The capodieci was paid by the pound—d.8 (for 554 lbs.), s.1 (for 2,729 
lbs.), s.1 d.4 (for 783 lbs.), and s.1 d.8 (for 2,207 lbs.) for a total of l.391 s.2 d.8 di piccioli—with 
 
82 For the guild legislation, see Hidetoshi Hoshini, L’arte della lana, 235-239. On the importance of rascie on the 
boom of the 1560s, see Patrick Chorley, “Rascie and the Florentine Cloth Industry during the Sixteenth Century,” 
Journal of European Economic History 32 (2003): 487–526. For the comparative seventeenth-century (1616-45) 
production of perpignani and rascie, see Ruggiero Romano, “À Florence au XVIIe siècle: Industries textiles et 
conjuncture,” Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations 7 (1952): 508–12. For the penetration of the Lyon cloth 
market, see, e.g., Albert Chamberland, Le commerce d'importation en France au milieu du XVIe siècle, document 
inédit, publié avec des notes et un tableau synoptique (Paris: Delagrave, 1894), 29-30.  




the rate dependent on the cloth that would ultimately be produced, such that wool destined to 
become rascie fetched the highest rate and wool for selvage (vivagno) the lowest.84 The capodieci 
sent some of the cleaned wool directly for dying-in-the-wool (nel colore)—for example, on 5-10 
August 1556 Battista di Pasquino sent 741 pounds (equivalent to 9.5 panni of 78 lbs each) to two 
companies of woad dyers (tintori di guado) that were paid l.14 per panno for turchini—but most 
was dyed after weaving as part of the finishing process.85 The capodieci was not the only such 
figure in the enterprise. Indeed, Medici and Co. similarly delegated two of the other major steps in 
the manufacturing process, combing and carding, to agents (fattori) to whom it made variable cash 
payments on a weekly schedule (almost always on Friday or Saturday) when active and who were 
in turn responsible for organizing and paying workers, with whom the firm itself had no direct 
contact, to do the necessary work. Over the course of two active periods (July 1556-January 1556/7 
and July 1557-September 1557), Agniolo di Giovanni, called “nostro fattore di petine (our agent 
who oversees combing)” received 33 cash payments (ranging from l.2 s.12 d.8 to l.43 s.8 di 
piccioli) in the total amount of l.724 s.15 d.4 di piccioli, while Antonio di Domenico da Prato, 
called “nostro fattore di chardo (our agent who oversees carding)” received 37 weekly cash 
payments (ranging from 1.5 to 1.37 s.10 di piccoli) in the total amount of l.592 s.9 d.8 di piccioli.86  
At the artisanal core of every lanaiolo’s operation was the process of turning spun woolen 
yarn into cloth, a matrix, tightly-interlaced at right angles, of longitudinal warp threads, made from 
combed wool (called stame) and held in tension on the loom, and the thicker tranversally-woven 
weft, made from carded wool (called lana). Our firm used three non-salaried agents to distribute 
stame and lana and pound-rate wages to spinners in the Florentine countryside, all of them women, 
and to collect and deliver the spun yarn to its bottega [FIGURE 12]: Tommaso di Christofano 
Brandolini (called nostro lanino), who distributed lana, and Alessandro di Domenico da 
berzighella (nostro stamaiuolo) and Pagholo di Lorenzo dal Borgho (stamaiuolo).87 As seen in 
[FIGURE 13A], which shows the cash payroll of the firm by month, the distribution/collection of 
yarn (including spinning, indirectly) and its subsequent weaving made up the bulk of the labor cost 
 
84 Ms. 567 (7), f. 10r.  
85 Ms. 567 (7), f.10r and 30rv. 
86 Ms. 567 (11), ff. 3v-5r, and cash accounts passim. The corresponding accounts in Ms. 567 (7), at cc. 50-60, are 
missing.  
87 Boccaccio’s tale of Pasquino and Simona (Decameron 4, 7) concerns the relationship of a lanino and a filatrice; for 
a brilliant reading of it, see Justin Steinberg, “Mimesis on Trial: Legal and Literary Verisimilitude in Boccaccio’s 




(in cash expenditures) and manufacturing process (in time), processes that occurred immediately 
after the acquisition and cleaning of new raw wool supplies. The firm paid twenty-six weavers, 
though each likely worked as half of a pair operating the horizontal loom, to produce all of its 
fabric, a cascading process that occurred when the availability of yarn and cash (on the Medici 
side) and of weavers aligned. In the absence of more reliable data, we can use the dates of the cash 
payments to weavers [FIGURE 13B] as a proxy for estimating the duration of the weaving process, 
with a full-size cloth seeming to require around two calendar weeks of weaving (compared, e.g., 
to 3-4 weeks for the Brandolini firm). For example, the most productive of our firm’s weavers, 
Catarina di Gabriello da Milano, worked four months to produce seven cloths.  
In the 1550s, the chief linear measures used in the Florentine cloth industry were the canna 
(pl. canne), ca. 2.33 meters or 2.55 yards in length, and the braccio (pl. braccia), ca. 58 centimeters 
or 23 inches, with four braccia combining to equal one canna. And wool manufacturers usually 
sold their product by the panno (pl. panni), the whole woolen cloth, which varied in length, often 
at a rate expressed in lire di piccioli per canna. [FIGURE 14] So, for example, the Medici firm’s 
first cloth sale on 30 January 1556/7 was to the firm of Benedetto di Ser Simone Guidi and Co., 
linaiuoli (manufacturers of linens), for one panno 17 canne 2 braccia in length at the price of 10 
lire di piccioli per canna or 175 total, equivalent to 25 florins.88 Assessing a loss of f.105 s.3 d.4,89 
the firm sold the cloths it produced at the combined price of f.2970 s.15 d.9.90 Of this, f.191 s.17 
d.9 (6.46%) represented cloth sold “by the cut (a taglio)”, i.e. in small pieces to various buyers, or 
by bulk weight, with the rest—some 67 cloths—sold by the panno to 31 firms or persons with 
accounts in the firm’s ledger. More than a third (23 or 34.33%) of the cloths were black rascie sold 
for an average of l.30 s.4 d.0 per canna, and a quarter (17 or 25.37) were undyed or white 
perpignani sold for an average of l.9 s.17 d.7. The remaining 40% of those sold were cloths—
sometimes coarse (corsivo), sometimes shorter than regulation size (scampolo)—of various colors: 
blacks (nero, nero di guado, nero di loto), blues (turchino, biadetto), tawny (tanè), green 
(festichino), yellow (giallo), and purple (paonazzo). 6 panni (nearly 9% of all the cloths sold) were 
bartered in exchange for Spanish wool; 20 panni (nearly 30%) were sold for cash; and 36 panni 
(nearly 54%) were sold on credit. Credit transactions were of three basic types: those requiring 
 
88 Ms. 600 (5), f. 1v.  
89 Ms. 567 (8), f. 41r.  





payment (1) in equal monthly or weekly installments, (2) in full at the end of a fixed period, or (3) 
in two or three equal monthly payments at the end of a fixed period. The sales of 73% of the sold 
panni were brokered by a broker (sensale) or middleman (mezzano) and the firm paid a total of f.7 
s.15 in brokerage fees (senserie).91 The most prolific of the middlemen, Benedetto Falcucci, for 
example, brokered the sale of more than half the firm’s output of black rascie and purchased one 
himself. In the firm’s account books, the language of cash and barter exchanges is simple. All of 
the former were recorded as “for cash (per li contantti)” and when the Medici and Raffaello di 
Domenico Borghini and Co. traded finished panni for five bales of wool they wrote in their 
Giornale only “to give in exchange for the Spanish wool gotten from them (per metere a rincontro 
della lana ispagniola avuta da lloro)”. The language and varieties of credit exchanges were more 
complicated, but nearly always more or less simple installment plans with no mention (in the firm’s 
public books) of an interest payment. Francesco di Filippo Gaburri made three purchases and was 
required to repay the first two (f.49 s.16 d.5 combined) at a rate of 6 florins per month and the 
third at (f.49 s.5 d.8) at a rate of 8 florins per month. More common were plans involving staggered 
repayment after a term of n months (“per tempo di mesi n”), as in the case of the Spaniard 
Gianalonso di Malvenda who was required to pay for his cloths in three equal monthly installments 
after a period of 10 months. 
* * * 
The fine black rascie could mean the difference between a profitable wool enterprise and 
an unprofitable one, and in its subsequent period, the same firm—the highly-profitable B ragione 
of Francesco di Giuliano’s wool company, which operated from 1558-61—produced and sold 
significantly more cloths, with a much higher percentage of them (80%) black rascia [FIGURE 
15], just as the middle quality broadcloth sopramani, then the most profitable type of Florentine 
woolen, had equaled over 70% of his father’s production in 1531-4 [FIGURE 16]. The rascie, as 
we noted above, also briefly saved the Florentine wool industry, but they could not keep it afloat 
forever. By the turn of the seventeenth century, the Arte della Lana was complaining to Grand 
Duke Ferdinando I of Florentine producers attempting to pass off lower quality cloths as rascie, 
squeezed by growing Venetian competition for markets and, crucially, for the supply of fine 
Spanish wool, which increased prices and of which Cosimo I had already received complaints as 
 





early as 1573.92  
In the aftermath of their moment of success, however, the Florentine rascie also crossed 
the blurry threshold into theory from mere business historical datum. In a chapter on “having in 
one’s possession some mercantia di momento,” some commodity of particular or even unique 
value or quality, in his On the Causes of the Greatness of Cities, Botero mentions, of course, that 
the “best wool” comes only from “a few towns in Spain and England”. But “[t]here are also 
excellent manufactures,” he notes, “that flourish in one place rather than another, either because 
of the quality of the water, the cleverness of the inhabitants, some secret method they employ, or 
some similar reason, such as the weapons of Damascus and Shiraz, the tapestries of Arras, the 
rascie of Florence, the velvets of Genoa, the brocades of Milan, the scarlet cloths of Venice.” The 
success of the rascie was the result not of the Arno’s water, but of a long-term convergence of 
management at the level of the entrepreneur, the guild, and the state. 
Just as Machiavelli advised princes, so did Botero:  
 
Above all he [the prince] must not permit the export of raw materials from his state, 
whether wool, silk, timber, metals or any other such thing… The prince’s revenues from 
the export of finished goods are much great than from that of primary materials… Taking 
account of this, in recent years the kings of France and England have forbidden the export 
of wool from their kingdoms, as the Catholic King [i.e. the King of Spain] later did too. 
But these prohibitions could not be obeyed at once, because those countries (provincie) 
abound in such incredible quantities of very fine wool that there were not enough skilled 
workers to use it all.93 
 
Botero’s codification of political economy can, from this perspective, be seen as a crucial link 
between the successful business practices that drove the Italian Renaissance on the one hand, and 
Serra’s revolutionary theorization of economic phenomena on the other. But if the insights here 
were new, the policies behind them were surely not: By the late 1400s numerous Castilian 
merchants (like Lopes Gallo) and other middlemen, like the Genoese traders who dominated the 
 
92 ASF, Pratica segreta, 9, f. 76 (1573); 16, f. 205r (1603); cited in Francesco Ammannati. “Florentine Woolen 
Manufacture in the Sixteenth Century: Crisis and New Entrepreneurial Strategies,” Business and Economic History 
On-Line 7 (2009): 1–9, 4 and 9.  




financial fairs at Medina del Campo, were resident in the city offering Castilian wool, but the 
Florentines, it is crucial to remember, had first been forced to turn to Spanish sources for fine raw 
wool only when English wool export duties on “aliens” were, beginning under Edward III, increased 
precipitously and wool prices were fixed to ensure that the cost would not be borne by English producers, 
which together reduced the Italian share of English wool sales from approximately 34% to 10% between 
1370 and 1410.94 Botero had centuries of models to follow, but, in many ways, his model princes were the 
contemporary Medici Grand Dukes of Tuscany, especially the first of them, Cosimo I, whom he called “a 
prince of outstanding judgment”, and his son Francesco, whose shared policy (“done most skillfully”) of 
attracting foreign skilled laborers served as a segue, in the first edition of his more famous 1589 The Reason 
of State, the first work to use that expression in its title, for repurposing the argument, quoted at length 
immediately above, about prohibiting the export of raw materials from the Causes.95 It is often hard to find 
the line between deserved praise and undue flattery in Renaissance writing about princes, and Medicean 
dirigisme under Cosimo I and Francesco has been little studied, but the best scholars have indeed 
highlighted its transformational ambition, with Richard Goldthwaite describing it as “an extraordinary 
policy, much ahead of its time, [that] clearly arose from Cosimo’s initiatives and enthusiasm”, and Judith 
Brown describing it as “activism aimed at the transformation of the entire economy”, a full-fledged 
“political economy”.96 
Immediately after noting the “profound silence” of Italian Renaissance thinkers on political 
economy, Hume declared that “[t]he great opulence, grandeur, and military achievements of the 
two maritime powers”—here intending the Dutch and the English—”seem first to have instructed 
mankind in the importance of an extensive commerce.”97 But were those who first instructed 
 
94 Munro, “Medieval Woolens”, 304-307. On the importance of Edward III’s policies for the development of political 
economy, see Sophus A. Reinert, Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2011), 93, 118, 164-166. 
95 Botero, The Reason of State, trans. Robert Bireley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 47 and 146; 
Bireley’s is an excellent new translation of Botero, Della ragion di stato, using texts from 1590-98. 
96 Quoting Richard A. Golthwaite, “Artisans and the Economy in Sixteenth-Century Florence,” in Cristina Acidini 
Luchinat et al., eds., The Medici, Michelangelo, and the Art of Late Renaissance Florence (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002), 85-93, 86; and Judith C. Brown, In the Shadow of Florence: Provincial Society in 
Renaissance Pescia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 281; see also Brown’s essential “Concepts of Political 
Economy: Cosimo I de’ Medici in a Comparative European Context”, in Firenze e la Toscana dei Medici nell’Europa 
del’500, volume 1 (Florence: Olschki, 1983), 279-93; cf. Furio Diaz’s approach is similar but negatively highlights 
the statist nature of the economic and political controls under the Grand Dukes, see Il Granducato di Toscana: I Medici 
(Turin: UTET, 1976), 127-48. See, on Cosimo I’s political economy, and particularly his emphasis on attracting high 
value-added economic activities to Tuscany, also Reinert, “Introduction” to Serra’s “Short Treatise”, 38-46 and, as 
evidence of a veritable “developmental state”, The Academy of Fisticuffs: Political Economy and Commercial Society 
in Enlightenment Italy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018), 400. Cosimo I was, not unexpectedly, celebrated 
in his own time with an outpouring of encomia; Carmen Menchini, Panegirici e vite di Cosimo I de’ Medici: Tra 
storia e propaganda (Florence: Olschki, 2005).  




mankind themselves without instructors? Were the Dutch and English really autodidacts? If not, 
who had taught them? And in what? The answer was suggested already in 1884 by the German 
historical economist Gustav von Schmoller: “what, to each in its time, gave riches and superiority 
first to Milan, Venice, Florence, and Genoa; then, later, to Spain and Portugal; and now to Holland, 
France, and England … was a state policy in economic matters (eine staatliche 
Wirtschaftspolitik),”98 an applied political economy first theorized and codified in the late Italian 
Renaissance by thinkers ignored by Hume; thinkers in scholastic, Counter-Reformation, Anti-
Machiavellian, and Reason-of-State contexts rather than republican and humanist ones; thinkers 
for whom wealth and virtue were natural partners; thinkers who drew their lessons not from the 
ancients, as Machiavelli had professed, but from the successful business practices and government 
policies of their time. That said, much suggests that these insights were even more widespread than 
that. For Florentines seem to have been eminently aware of the importance of measures to protect 
and encourage domestic manufactures throughout the Renaissance. Already in 1458, a Florentine 
commission declared that the city had “became powerful and great through her industries and 
business, and thanks to these it defended itself from all oppression”.99 And even the humanist 
Aurelio Lippo Brandolini would write, in his c. 1490 Republics and Kingdoms Compared, of how 
Florence could protect its “empire” only with “the help of large duties” on trade and by prohibiting 
the “importation” of goods “we ourselves manufacture, all woolens and silks… so that we can sell 
our own, and to prevent foreign wares bringing down the price or reputation of ours”. This because, 
as Brandolini quoted the Roman playwright Terence, “everyone prefers his own betterment to 
another’s”.100 
 
98 We quote Schmoller, The Mercantile System and its Historical Significance (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1897), 48, translated from an extract from Schmoller’s twelve-part 1884-87 series “Studien über die wirtschaftliche 
Politik Friedrichs des Großen und Preußens überhaupt von 1680 bis 1786”; for the original German, see the second 
part, “II. Das Merkantilsystem in seiner historischen Bedeutung: städtische, territoriale und staatliche 
Wirthschaftspolitik,” Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich 8 (1884): 15-
61, 42. For the context out of which Schmoller emerged, see Erik Grimmer-Solem, The Rise of Historical Economics 
and Social Reform in Germany 1864-1894 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Reinert discusses at greater 
length the heuristic value of Schmoller’s analysis in The Academy of Fisticuffs. 
99 Quoted by Goldthwaite, Economy of Renaissance Florence, 591, from Franco Franceschi, “Intervento del potere 
centrale e ruolo delle Arti del governo dell’economia piorentina del Trecento e del primo Quattrocento: Linee 
generali”, Archivio storico italiano 151 (1993): 863-909, at 864. For a similar statement a century later, see Giacomo 
Lanteri, Della economica (Venice: Valgrisi, 1560), 98. 
100 Aurelio Lippo Brandolini, Republics and Kingdoms Compared, ed. James Hankins (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2009), 123-5, quoting, as Hankins has shown, Terence, A[n]dria 427: “Omnes sibi malle melius esse 




In line with Hegel’s frequently quoted dictum that “the owl of Minerva spreads its wings 
only with the falling of the dusk,” the historical mechanisms of Italy’s success, however, were 
only codified politically and theorized economically once decline already had set in and the center 
of gravity in the European economy had begun to move north and west. Soon enough, Italian 
writers themselves took note of how England and the Low Countries had come to beat them at 
their own game by adopting precisely the measures argued for by Botero, working their own raw 
materials and embracing import-substitution. As Fernand Braudel concluded in his Out of Italy, 
the city-states of the peninsula declined also by virtue of teaching the rest of Europe their practices, 
or what he called “le Modèle italien”.101 There are few better lenses for appreciating this process 
than that of Florentine woolen manufactures and the origins of political economy.  
As such, a broadening of the traditional context for considering the history of political 
economy to include not only texts but the worlds of business enterprise as well as guild and 
government policies suggests fertile fields for future inquiry. For if Pocock delineated a powerful 
“Atlantic Republican Tradition” originating in Renaissance Florence, the extraordinary popularity 
of Botero’s work in the European world—and of what we have called “the Italian tradition” more 
broadly—allows us to adumbrate a different but no less consequential conceptual arc (one which, 
because of its explicitly “economic” nature, Hont might even have called “modern”) similarly 
bridging Renaissance Italy to the rise of Britain, the birth of the United States, and the world which 
we inhabit.102 Through careful readers such as Francis Bacon, William Petty, and Veit Ludwig von 
Seckendorff, Botero’s original observation about the superiority of industry in Renaissance 
Florence and the importance of nurturing domestic manufactures to secure greatness in a world of 
relentless international competition was sequentially institutionalized in the theories, policies, and 
business strategies of emerging powers everywhere, from the Germanic world of Cameralism and 
John Cary’s England to Alexander Hamilton’s nascent United States of America, and, eventually, 
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University Press, 2015). For an earlier Tuscan analysis of this phenomenon, see, Giovanni Francesco Pagnini, Della 
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well beyond to our day and age. To engage with the political economy of the Italian Renaissance 
is to engage with the development of our world as we know it. For better and for worse, we are 
still crossing Botero’s bridge, its end perennially out of sight.103 
 
103 On this theme, see again Reinert, Translating Empire, “Rivalry”, and, for an earlier statement about Botero’s 
influence on European political economy, Reinert “Cameralism and Commercial Rivalry: Nationbuilding through 
Economic Autarky in Seckendorff’s 1665 Additiones”, European Journal of Law and Economics 19 (2005): 271-286. 
On Botero’s Greatness of Cities and Reason of State as a publishing phenomena throughout the European world, 
reaching at least 42 editions between them in numerous languages before 1830, see now Erik S. Reinert and Fernanda 
Reinert, “33 Economic Bestsellers Published Before 1750”, The European Journal of the History of Economic 
Thought 26 (2019), 17-21. On Botero’s extraordinary importance in England, in particular, see Jamie Trace, Giovanni 
Botero and English Political Thought, PhD Dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2018. 
